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INTRODUCTION
Functioning in independent, sequential roles, much like sorting
arms in a complex assembly line, federal courts and the Federal Bu-
reau of Prisons have traditionally relied upon shared assumptions
when sentencing convicted defendants and placing them in appropri-
ate facilities. The power to decide the length and nature of a defen-
dant's sentence rests exclusively in the hands of federal judges,3 who
must apply sentencing formulas prescribed by the United States Sen-
(2000)); Robert A. Anthony, "Interpretive" Rules, "Legislative" Rules and "Spurious" Rules:
Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 4 n.13 (1994) ("'Smog' has become a catchword for
the perplexities that beset the distinctions among nonlegislative rules.").
3 Cf United States v. Curry, 767 F.2d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The determination
of a sentence imposes a responsibility of staggering proportions on the court. In the eyes
of most citizens, this function is probably the single most important duty performed by
judges.... The . . . view that such a function should be performed only by one who has
had the opportunity to judge for himself the credibility of those on whose word the deci-
sion is based is in line with one of the most deeply rooted principles in our law."); Banks v.
United States, 614 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir. 1980) ("Sentencing is probably the most difficult
task faced by a federal district judge."); lacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015,
1022 (D. Mass. 2003) ("No judicial responsibility is more serious than sentencing.").
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tencing Commission (the Commission) 4 and who may, in their lim-
ited discretion, evaluate additional factors. 5 Similarly, the power to
place an individual in a penal or correctional facility rests exclusively
with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (the Bureau),6 a federal agency
under the authority of the Department of Justice (DOJ).7 Despite the
strict statutory demarcation of their responsibilities, federal courts
and the Bureau have nonetheless developed common understandings
to facilitate the seamless transfer and review of prisoners. 8
For over forty years, 9 the Bureau heeded judges' recommenda-
tions that it place select nonviolent offenders with short sentences in
Community Confinement Centers (CCCs),1 ° more commonly known
as halfway houses.1' This long-standing practice permitted judges to
consider alternative forms of incarceration for cases "on the border-
4 The Commission is an independent federal agency whose "purpose is to establish
sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice system that will assure the
ends of justice by promulgating detailed guidelines prescribing the appropriate sentences
for offenders convicted of federal crimes." See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1,
pt. A, at 1 (2001).
5 See id. Under the modern sentencing system, federal judges select a criminal sen-
tence in accordance with detailed guidelines issued by the Commission. See id. Congress
and the Commission promulgated the Guidelines to eliminate arbitrary discrepancies in
sentencing. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (b)(1)(B) (2000). The Supreme Court's recent decision in
United States v. Booker, _ U.S. __ , 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), finding that certain mandatory
provisions of the Federal Sentencing Act are incompatible with defendants' Sixth Amend-
ment rights and must be severed from the Act, does not alter the conclusions of this Note.
See also discussion infra Part I.C.1, III.B.1-2 (supporting this Note's premise that the Guide-
lines bind only federal judges and that the Department ofJustice improperly stretched the
Guidelines to restrict the discretion of the Federal Bureau of Prisons).
6 Congress created the Federal Bureau of Prisons in 1930 to "professionalize the
prison service, and to ensure consistent and centralized administration of the 11 Federal
prisons in operation at that time." FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ABOUT
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 2 (2001), available at http://www.bop.gov/news/PDFs/
lpaabout.pdf [hereinafter ABOUT THE BUREAU].
7 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.1, 0.95-99 (2004); see discussion infra Part IV.B.
8 See An Interview with Bureau of Prisons Director Kathleen M. Hawk, THE THIRD BRANCH,
June 1996, http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jun96ttb/hawk.htm ("We take very seriously judi-
cial recommendations that an inmate be placed in a particular institution or particular
type of institution.... The [B]ureau's mission is to carry out the sentences of the courts
... . .).
9 See, e.g., Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 205 (D. Mass. 2003).
10 A CCC is a "community treatment center, halfway house, restitution center, mental
health facility, alcohol or drug rehabilitation center, or other community facility" where
residents participate in "gainful employment, employment search efforts, community ser-
vice, vocational training, treatment, educational programs, or similar facility-approved pro-
grams during non-residential hours." See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5F1l.1,
cmt. n.1 (2001). But cf Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 522 n.13 (M.D. La. 2003)
(suggesting that the term "halfway house" may be misleading, because not all inmates are
"halfway between jail and home," but rather are punished for an extended period of time,
with limited privileges for employment and some contact with the community).
1 The Bureau nonetheless retained its discretion to disregard such judicial recom-
mendations. See lacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1023 (D. Mass. 2003).
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line between probation and incarceration."1 2 At the same time, this
alternative permitted the Bureau to place nonviolent prisoners in a
facility that was cost effective to taxpayers and the defendants' com-
munities. 13 Congress and the Commission consistently encouraged
the use of this alternative, and the Supreme Court noted it with ap-
proval. 14 Bureau guidance manuals, published by the DOJ, also docu-
mented and reinforced this practice. 15
In December 2002, however, the DOJ caused a "sea change in
settled understandings" 16 by announcing that placing individuals di-
rectly in CCCs was "unlawful. ' 17 In the form of a memorandum (the
Memorandum), the DOJ instructed the Bureau to disregard any pro-
spective recommendations for CCC placement, 18 as well as to apply
the new "policy"19 retroactively. 20 This abrupt change prompted indi-
viduals to challenge the Memorandum's "policy" and file for injunc-
tions to prevent their immediate transfer from CCCs to more
conventional prisons.21 Such petitions raised the ire ofjudges nation-
wide, 22 who expressed shock at the "amputation of the [Bureau's] dis-
12 Monahan, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
13 Prisoners in a CCC were required to contribute twenty-five percent of their gross
income to help defray the costs of the CCC. See Program Statement No. 7310.04, Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Community Corrections Center (CCC) Utilization
and Transfer Procedure 4 (Dec. 16, 1998), http://www.bop.gov//policy/progstat/7310-
004.pdf [hereinafter Program Statement No. 7310.04]. Additionally, the cost of confining
an individual in a CCC is "far less than the price tag on more conventional forms of impris-
onment." Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1023. CCCs were also a desirable choice because an
inmate could "continue employment outside the facility during the day, and can maintain
ties with vulnerable family members, such as children or ailing parents"; the inmate's em-
ployment often permitted families to stay out of the welfare and the foster care systems. Id,
at 1022.
14 See Byrd v. Moore, 252 F. Supp. 2d 293, 299 (W.D.N.C. 2003).
15 See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
16 Mallory v. United States, No. Civ.A. 03-10220-DPW, 2003 WL 1563764, at *1 (D.
Mass. Mar. 25, 2003).
17 See Memorandum Opinion from M. Edward Whelan III, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to the Deputy Attorney
General (Dec. 13, 2002), http://fd.org/Publications/SpecTop/bopimp.PDF (online ver-
sion at 1) [hereinafter Memorandum (paginated as online version)].
18 See id. at 8.
19 The label "policy," as distinguished from "rule," signals important implications in
the context of administrative law. This Note will refer to the DOJ Memorandum as a "pol-
icy" until Part IV, when it will address reasons for classifying it as either a policy or a rule.
Throughout their analyses, several district courts referred to the Memorandum as a "pol-
icy" to indicate that they reserved judgment as to the proper classification of the action
prior to a full analysis of the label and its ramifications. See, e.g., Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F.
Supp. 2d 518, 525-26 (M.D. La. 2003). This Note adopts the use of this term in quotations
to indicate the same.
20 See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Jacaboni v. United States, F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1018 (D. Mass. 2003);
Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 199-200 (D. Mass. 2003).
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cretion"23 and the insult to the courts, and who criticized that even if
the Bureau's "about-face on community corrections could somehow
be justified . . . it should never have been carried out in the cavalier
manner it was." 24
The Memorandum marked a radical shift from the preexisting
policy, which had been "repeatedly and explicitly conveyed to the ju-
diciary" since 1965 and under which the Bureau considered judicial
recommendations regarding sentencing when it was appropriate to do
so. 2 5 The DOJ, however, firmly defended the Memorandum on the
grounds that it corrected a long-standing erroneous application of 18
U.S.C. § 3621, the statute outlining the Bureau's responsibilities with
respect to convicted individuals. 26 The DOJ argued that community
confinement does not constitute imprisonment for the purposes of a
sentencing order,27 and that the Bureau consequently lacks the au-
thority to place in community confinement an offender who has been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment.2 8 The DOJ thus declared that
the Bureau could no longer designate offenders to CCCs or heed judi-
cial recommendations for such placement. 29 The DOJ directed the
Bureau to apply this new placement regime both prospectively and
retroactively, forcing inmates who had more than 150 days remaining
in their sentences to transfer from CCCs to conventional prisons.3 0
While many commentators presume that the impetus for the Memo-
randum was a general crackdown on white-collar criminals,3 1 the DOJ
has not publicly asserted a reason for revisiting the Bureau's discre-
tion under § 3261.32
The Memorandum caught the courts, prisoners, and even some
at the Bureau by surprise. Prisoners' petitions in the face of impend-
ing transfer to distant, minimum-security facilities demonstrated the
personal costs of the DOJ's policy shift. The petitioners' stories high-
lighted the effectiveness of confinement in CCCs, describing how
CCCs rehabilitated nonviolent offenders and permitted them to pro-
vide for their children and families, while nonetheless isolating them
23 lacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1018.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1017.
26 See 18 U.S.C. § 3621 (2000); Memorandum, supra note 18, at 1-9.
27 Memorandum, supra note 17, at 1-4.
28 Id. at 5-9.
29 Id. at 4, 8-9.
30 See Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1017.
31 See id. at 1023; Dan Eggen, White-Collar Crime Now Gets Real Time: New Federal Prison
Policy Criticized, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2003, at A6.
32 But cf Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 205 n.9 (D. Mass. 2003) ("There is a
certain disingenuousness about the 'occasion' for this revisitation of policy. The [DOJ]
Opinion is written as if in response to a [Bureau] consultation about an unanswered ques-
tion regarding its authority ... when in fact the issue was well-settled in a [Bureau] Pro-
gram Statement and manual.").
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from society as punishment for their offenses. 33 On an institutional
level, the abruptness of the DOJ's "policy" change and its retroactive
application clearly struck a nerve on the bench. Courts expressed out-
rage that, months after judges had sentenced certain defendants, a
"bureaucrat in an office in Washington D.C. determined that the en-
tire legal world had been acting under the same shared 'unlawful'
fantasy for decades and acted to bring us all back into step with his
vision of the law." 34
Petitioners sought relief from the retroactive application of the
DOJ "policy" by filing preliminary injunctions in federal district courts
throughout the country. While some courts rejected petitioners'
claims on the grounds that petitioners had not exhausted their admin-
istrative remedies, 35 other courts agreed to hear petitioners' claims
on the grounds that any further administrative appeal was futile in
light of the DOJ's unyielding "policy."36 Scrutinizing the Memoran-
dum, this second group of courts concluded that the DOJ's "policy"
substantively lacked merit and that Congress did not intend to reduce
the Bureau's discretion to designate prisoners to facilities under the
Bureau's control. 37 These courts ruled that the Memorandum was a
substantive rule and was therefore procedurally invalid for its failure
to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).38 Further,
these courts argued that the retroactive application of the DOJ's "pol-
icy" violated constitutional due-process protections afforded to per-
sons standing before a court for sentencing.3 9
33 See, e.g., Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 535 (M.D. La. 2003); lacaboni, 251
F. Supp. 2d at 1022-23.
34 See Howard, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
-5 See, e.g., United States v. James, 244 F. Supp. 2d 817, 820 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (assert-
ing that the court did not have jurisdiction to grant the prisoner a temporary restraining
order to prevent the Bureau from transferring him from a CCC to a conventional prison,
because Congress intended prison designation to be a matter of Bureau discretion). Sev-
eral courts also expressed doubt that any judge's decision to recommend CCC placement
could have been material where the recommendation itself was not binding upon the Bu-
reau. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, No. 02 CR 47, 2003 ArL 1964489, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 28, 2003); Borgetti v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 03 C 50034, 2003 WL 743936, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 14, 2003); United States v. Herron, Nos. 03-3039-JAR, 02-40056-001-JAR, 2003 WL
272170, at *1-2 (D. Kan. Feb. 3, 2003); James, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 819; United States v.
Schild, Nos. 00-40021-01, 03-3028-RDR, 2003 WL 260672, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan 21, 2003);
United States v. Andrews, 244 F. Supp. 2d 636, 639 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
36 See, e.g., Monahan, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 204-05; Howard, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 532-34;
Ferguson v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 547, 563 (M.D. La. 2003).
37 See, e.g., Monahan, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 199-200; Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1017-18
(commenting that the "well-established practice of the [Bureau] . . . was not, and is not,
even remotely 'unlawful'").
38 See, e.g., Monahan, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 215; Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1038-40;
discussion infra Part III.A-B.
39 This Note will not address the propriety of retroactively applying the DOJ's new
.policy" to prisoners' detriment once the sentencing phase was already completed. For
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This Note endeavors to understand what powers Congress in-
tended to delegate to the federal courts and the Bureau concerning
CCCs. Part I will discuss the history of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines (the Guidelines) and the limitations they impose upon judicial
discretion, the history of the Bureau and the relative breadth of its
statutory authority, and the specific treatment of CCCs in the Guide-
lines and Bureau documents prior to December 2002. Part II will
probe the DOJ's December 2002 Memorandum, contrasting the
DOJ's interpretations with preexisting understandings between fed-
eral judges and the Bureau regarding CCC placement. Part III will
discuss the distinction between substantive and interpretive rules, and
will argue that the DOJ's "policy" poses as a substantive rule in dis-
guise and as such is procedurally invalid for failure to comply with the
APA notice and comment procedures. Under the guidance of United
States v. Mead Coip.40 and Skidmore v. Swifit & Co., 4 1 Part IV presents
analysis in the alternative and assesses the reasonableness of the DOJ's
Memorandum as an interpretive rule. This Note will acknowledge
that the DOJ ultimately wields the authority to reverse the long-stand-
ing practice of placing inmates in CCCs, regardless of what the impe-
tus for the revision might have been. It will conclude, however, that
the DOJ improperly employed a statutory argument to avoid procedu-
ral due-process requirements and to unhinge sentences that judges
had carefully evaluated. 42
I
LAYING THE HISTORICAL GROUNDWORK: THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, THE BUREAu OF PRISONS, AND
COMMUNITY CONFINEMENT CENTERS
A. Balancing Uniformity and Judicial Discretion: The Purpose
and Scope of Sentencing Guidelines
Seeking to curb nationwide dissatisfaction with the disparity and
uncertainty resulting from discretionary sentencing, Congress enacted
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA). The SRA's purpose was to
replace a system in which 'judges received wide ranges within which
to sentence, but no anchoring point from which to begin," 43 with a
discussion of the due-process implications of retroactive application, see the cases cited in
supra notes 35-36.
40 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
41 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
42 See discussion infra Part IV.
43 Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1687 (1992); see Leslie A. Cory, Looking at the
Federal Sentencing Process One Judge at a Time, One Probation Officer at a Time, 51 EMORY L.J.
379, 387-88 (2002) (commenting that prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, "Con-
gress had provided courts with very little statutory guidance .... Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 3561
2005]
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"comprehensive and consistent statement of the Federal law of sen-
tencing, setting forth the purposes to be served." 4 4 The product of
this effort, the Guidelines, thus introduced a sentencing structure lim-
iting judicial discretion. 45 Congress conceived of the Guidelines to
assure consistency in sentencing so that the purpose and rationale be-
hind each sentence would be clear to all parties involved.46 The re-
sulting system of guidelines now applies to more than ninety percent
of all felonies and Class A misdemeanor cases in federal courts.47
The SRA created the Commission as the centerpiece of its efforts
to reduce sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records and comparable convictions.48 Congress directed the Com-
mission, an independent agency within the judicial branch, to develop
sentencing guidelines utilizing categories of offenses and offenders to
prescribe suggested sentencing ranges.49 Congress did not grant the
Commission power to enforce the Guidelines. 50 Rather, it intended
for the Commission, a "nonpolitical group of sentencing experts,"51 to
and 3562, both repealed when the sentencing guidelines took effect in 1987, provided only
that judgment and sentence would be imposed pursuant to Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Rule 32, in turn, provided minimal guidance.").
44 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 39 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3222.
45 See Freed, supra note 43, at 1683 (suggesting that a system of guidelines "must leave
ample room for departures from the guidelines range so that judges can accommodate
cases of greater and lesser seriousness. It must be developed by an institution that under-
stands the complexity of criminal sentencing, that appreciates the wisdom, integrity and
sense ofjustice that animates experienced judges, and that earns the respect ofjudges and
practitioners.").
46 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 59 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3242.
47 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, at 11 (2001). A summary
report surveying judges' views of the efficacy of the Guidelines in meeting their purported
goals, collected on the fifteenth anniversary of the Guidelines, found that judges believed
that the Guidelines had been "relatively effective" in achieving the SRA goals of "providing
punishment levels that reflect the seriousness of the offense," "providing adequate deter-
rence to criminal conduct," "protecting the public from further crimes of the defendant,"
and "avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records."
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SURVEY OF ARTICLE III JUDGES: A COMPONENT OF THE FIFTEEN
YEAR REPORT ON THE U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION'S LEGISLATIVE MANDATE 2 (2002). The
report indicated that a plurality ofjudges responding to the survey opined that the Guide-
lines were least effective in "providing defendants with training, medical care, or treatment
in the most effective manner.., and maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individual-
ized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors." Id.
48 See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2000).
49 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1) (2000); William P. Ferranti, Note, Revised Sentencing
Guidelines and the Ex Post Facto Clause, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1011, 1013 (2003) (noting that the
Commission must consist of "seven voting members, at least three of whom are federal
judges").
50 See Freed, supra note 43, at 1690. The Guidelines became effective after complying
with applicable requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act and after a six-month
period of congressional oversight and review. Id. at 1695.
51 Id. at 1690.
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draft the Guidelines, and expected federal courts to independently
enforce them.52
Although the SRA anticipated that the Guidelines would incorpo-
rate prior judicial practice, the very existence of the Guidelines dis-
placed traditional judicial discretion in sentencing, requiring federal
judges to implement the Guidelines and holding judges accountable
for each sentencing choice. 53 By explicitly separating the functions of
creating and enforcing the Guidelines, and by focusing all of the
Guidelines' directives upon the federal courts,54 Congress made one
thing clear: The binding authority of the Guidelines was intended to
restrain only federal courts. Indeed, the "Guidelines are administra-
tive handcuffs that are applied to judges and no one else. '" 55
The Guidelines specifically acknowledge judges' singular author-
ity to determine the length and nature of defendants' sentences, and
endeavor to cabin a judge's discretion without depriving him of the
power to exercise discretion in limited situations in which he deems it
appropriate. 56 Attempting to balance uniformity with the need for
discretion in individual cases, the Guidelines arm judges with a range
of sentences and enumerate limited grounds for departure from these
prescribed ranges. 57 Despite providing grounds for departure from
the Guidelines, however, the Commission intended the number of
such departures to gradually decrease. Viewing the Commission as a
permanent body whose objective was to create a more accurate grid
over time, the SRA expected the Guidelines to adapt to previously un-
52 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (outlining the duties of the Commission and charging it to
"promulgate and distribute ... guidelines... for use of a sentencing court in determining the
sentence to be imposed in a criminal case" (emphasis added)).
53 See Freed, supra note 43, at 1697 (noting that a federal judge must explain each
sentence, "including a 'specific reason' for some sentences, and [that] his decision is sub-
ject to appellate scrutiny").
54 See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (2001) (discussing the
SRA, outlining the Commission's efforts and reasoning in promulgating the Guidelines,
and describing how the Guidelines would be applied by the federal courts).
55 Freed, supra note 43, at 1697 (noting that the Guidelines do not bind, for example,
a U.S. Attorney negotiating a particular disposition, such as a plea bargain).
56 See Iacaboni v. United States 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1034 (D. Mass. 2003).
57 See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2000) (indicating that a court may consider, without limita-
tion, "information concerning the background, character, and conduct" of the defen-
dant); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5K2.0-.2 (2001) (enumerating appropriate
grounds for departure, including coercion, distress, and diminished capacity); Ferranti,
supra note 49, at 1013-14 (explaining that a judge may only review the guidelines, policy
statements, and official commentary issued by the Commission in deciding whether to de-
part from the prescribed sentencing range, and that a decision to depart is subject to
review for abuse of discretion). The limited reach of the Guidelines has been reenforced
by the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Booker, - U.S. - (2005), 125
S. Ct. 738, which found that certain mandatory provisions within the Guidelines must be
severed because they are incompatible with defendants' Sixth Amendment rights, id. at
759.
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foreseen circumstances with uniform solutions, thereby limiting the
volume of departures over time, both in principle and in practice. 58
B. The Federal Bureau of Prisons: Placing Individuals in the
Post-Sentencing Phase
The Bureau, a federal agency under the direction of the Attorney
General, was formed in 1930 in an effort to develop and manage an
integrated system of prisons.59 Replacing a system in which Congress
separately financed the eleven existing federal prisons,60 Congress
granted the Bureau control and regulation of all federal penal and
correctional institutions. 61 Congress entrusted the Bureau with the
role of "protect[ing] society by confining offenders in the controlled
environments of prison and community based facilities that are safe,
humane, cost-efficient, and appropriately secure," as well as maintain-
ing work and other self-improvement opportunities for those in the
Bureau's custody.62 Today, the Bureau directs over 100 federal pris-
ons as well as over thirty community corrections offices. 63
Rather than encouraging sentencing courts and the Bureau to
operate in tandem, Congress specifically designed independent, albeit
sequential, responsibilities and spheres of influence for the courts and
the Bureau. As such, "[a] Person who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment... shall be committed to the custody of the Bureau of
Prisons until the expiration of the term imposed, or until earlier re-
lease for satisfactory behavior." 64 Thus, after a court has sentenced an
individual to prison, that individual becomes the Bureau's responsibil-
ity and remains in the Bureau's custody through the term of imprison-
ment. The Bureau has the initial responsibility of "designat[ing as]
the place of the prisoner's imprisonment . . .any available penal or
correctional facility that meets minimum standards of health and hab-
itability established by the Bureau," upon considering a number of
factors in its discretion, including the resources of particular facilities,
the criminal history of the individual, and the nature and circum-
stances of her offense. 65 The Bureau may also consider any statement
by the sentencing judge, either concerning the purpose of the individ-
ual's imprisonment or concerning a recommendation for a specific
58 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.1, pt. A, at 6 (2001).
59 See 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a) (2000); supra note 6.
60 See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 1 (2004), available at http://www.bop.gov//news/PDFs/legal
_guide.pdf [hereinafter LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE].
61 See 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a).
62 See LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 60, at 1.
63 Id.
64 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
65 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).
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type of penal or correctional facility, as well as any pertinent policy
statement issued by the Commission 'pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(a) (2).66
The Bureau retains broad discretion and may designate a pris-
oner to any penal or correctional facility, so long as it meets "mini-
mum standards of health and habitability."67 Official documents
issued by the DOJ endorse this broad view of the Bureau's discretion,
claiming that the statutory authority granted in the phrase "any availa-
ble penal or correctional facility"68 trumps other perceived statutory
limitations on the Bureau.69
C. Community Confinement Centers as Conceived by the
Guidelines and the Bureau
1. Section 5C1. 1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and Its Directives
Concerning CCCs
CCCs provide two distinct programs: a prerelease component and
a community corrections component.70 The Guidelines devote them-
selves to calculating the nature and length of a term of imprisonment,
rather than the location of an individual's imprisonment. By corol-
lary, the Guidelines do not address the direct placement of convicted
individuals in the community corrections component of CCCs, and
the language of the Guidelines does not address the focus of the Bu-
reau's "policy" change in December 2002. The Guidelines limit dis-
cussion of CCCs to proper consideration of the prerelease
component, a placement that facilitates a prisoner's transition to a
community, 7' specifically counseling in section 5C1.1 that a sentence
of imprisonment may include "a term of supervised release with a con-
dition that substitutes community confinement or home detenion. 72
The Guidelines thus permit judges to alter the quality of an individ-
ual's sentence without departing from the prescribed sentencing
ranges for the individual's offense.
The Guidelines specifically provide that one day of community
confinement, denoted as "residence in a community treatment
66 See id.
67 See id.; Byrd v. Moore, 252 F. Supp. 2d 293, 301 (W.D.N.C. 2003) (emphasis added)
(suggesting that § 3621 (b) is constructed so broadly that it "rules out almost no imaginable
facility or institution, public or privately owned"); infra Part I.C.2.
68 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).
69 See Program Statement No. 7310.04, supra note 13, at 4 (indicating that perceived
limitations set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) do not restrict the scope of authority granted by
§ 3621 (b)).
70 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N & FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON THE MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF PRISONS RESOURCES 9-10 (1994) [hereinafter REPORT TO
CONGRESS].
71 See Program Statement No. 7310.04, supra note 13, at 5.
72 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.1 (c) (2) (2001).
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center, halfway house, or similar residential facility," may be substi-
tuted for one day of imprisonment. 73 Application notes to section
5C1.1 suggest that a judge "may impose a sentence of imprisonment
that includes a term of supervised release with a condition that re-
quires community confinement or home detention. ' 74 These notes
acknowledge that the prerelease component is a part of imprison-
ment, rather than a term separate from imprisonment, stating that a
sentence may include a term of supervised release. 75 The Guidelines
do not, however, recommend use of this discretionary tool for individ-
uals qualifying for a criminal history category of III or higher.76 The
Guidelines also specifically prescribe that defendants in Zone D on
the sentencing table must fulfill the minimum term of imprisonment
without use of any imprisonment substitutes. 77 Limiting discussion of
CCCs to the prerelease component, the Guidelines thus supply courts
with an important, albeit limited, discretionary tool that allows them
to operate within the Guidelines' prescribed sentencing range and to
simultaneously facilitate inmates' transitions from the prison system to
society.
Since 1965,78 federal judges have taken their cues from statutory
language directing the Bureau to consider "any statement by the court
that imposed the sentence ... recommending a type of penal or cor-
rectional facility as appropriate,' 79 and have recommended direct
placement in CCCs for certain individuals. judges have relied upon
the availability of this option, particularly when evaluating sentences
for individuals whose cases seem to lie on the difficult line between
probation and incarceration or whose cases present particular hard-
ships and concerns to the court.80 Nonetheless, the Bureau funda-
mentally retained the discretion to disregard judicial
73 See id. § 5C1.1(e) (2).
74 See id. § 5C1.1 cmt. n.3(C).
75 See id. § 5C1.1 cmt. n.4(B) ("[A]t least one-half of the minimum term specified in
the guideline range must be satisfied by imprisonment, and the remainder of the mini-
mum term specified in the guideline range must be satisfied by community confinement
or home detention.").
76 See id. § 5C1.1 cmt. n.7.
77 The Guidelines follow a categorical table which classifies defendents by the severity
of their crime and their previous criminal history. On this scale, Zone D defendants have
the highest classification for both categories. See id. § 5Cl.I(f).
78 See Iacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1017 (D. Mass. 2003).
79 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (4) (2000).
80 See lacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1021 (noting that without the possibility of direct
CCC placement, the judge would have considered sentencing the defendant to four years
probation with the first year to be served in the CCC, thus assuring that the defendant
would remain close to home).
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recommendations and to designate placement without judicial
interference.81
2. The Bureau's Long-Standing Encouragement of CCC Placement
Acknowledging that "[n]ot all Federal inmates are confined in
prisons with fences," the Bureau has consistently encouraged alterna-
tive modes of incarceration, recognizing that such placement may be
more appropriate in certain circumstances and may simultaneously
relieve the strain on the system of penal and correctional institutions
as a whole.8 2 As late as January 2003, Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, then-
director of the Bureau, confirmed the Bureau's preexisting "deeply
rooted practice of honoring, when appropriate, judicial recommenda-
tions that low-risk, non-violent offenders serving short prison
sentences be directly designated to [CCCs] ." Ms. Hawk Sawyer's em-
phasis on the words "when appropriate" underscores the fact that the
Bureau retained the discretion to disregard judicial recommendations
concerning designation to a CCC or comparable facility. Further, her
comments confirm the existence of a long-standing accord between
the Bureau and the federal courts prior to December 2002.
The Bureau repeatedly publicized its policy concerning direct
placement in CCCs in statements to Congress, manuals to federal
courts, and publications for general distribution. Specifically describ-
ing CCCs as "correctional facilities, '8 4 the Bureau represented to Con-
gress in 1994 that "[t]he community corrections component [was]
designed to be sufficiently punitive to be a legitimate sanction."85 Bu-
reau Program Statement No. 7310.04 confirmed this definition in
practice, noting that "' [t] he Bureau may designate any available penal
or correctional facility ... the Bureau determines to be appropriate
and suitable' 8,s6 and that "[a] CCC meets the definition of a 'penal or
correctional facility.' ,87 This document conclusively defined CCCs as
"'halfway houses,' provid[ing] suitable residence, structured pro-
grams, job placement, and counseling," but otherwise confining and
closely monitoring inmates.88 Further, the program statement classi-
fied the community corrections component as "the most restrictive
81 See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (4) (stating that the Bureau may consider judicial recom-
mendations and implying that the Bureau is not bound by them).
82 See ABOUT THE BUREAU, supra note 6, at 10.
83 See Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1022 (quoting Ms. Hawk Sawyer's response to a
letter from Judge Ponsor, which had "question[ed] the manner and substance of the [Bu-
reau's] abrupt turnabout").
84 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 70, at 10.
85 Id. at 9-10.
86 Program Statement No. 7310.04, supra note 13, at 4 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)
(1994)).
87 Id.
88 Id.
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option," in which inmates are released from confinement in the CCC
only for employment and limited, structured activities pending ap-
proval of the CCC.89 As compensation for this flexibility, inmates paid
twenty-five percent of their earnings as subsistence to the CCC, paying
in part for their room and board.90
Characterizing the community corrections component of CCCs
as more restrictive than the prerelease component, Bureau docu-
ments clearly distinguished the components as separate programs re-
quiring separate regulation. Regarding the prerelease component of
CCCs, the Bureau has traditionally followed clear statutory authority
instructing it to place prisoners in CCCs for the last ten percent of
imprisonment, a period not to exceed six months, affording prisoners
an opportunity to prepare for their transition out of an institutional-
ized setting. 91 Multiple Bureau manuals detail how and when a pris-
oner may be referred to a CCC for the prerelease component and
how the Bureau may decide which CCC may best facilitate a prisoner's
transition, as well as offering the Bureau detailed guidance regarding
all aspects of prerelease placement. 92
In the Judicial Resource Guide to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (judicial
Resource Guide), the DOJ offered federal judges clear guidance con-
cerning direct placement in CCCs' community corrections compo-
nent. Under the heading, "Imprisonment," the document permits
the Bureau to place an offender directly in a community-based facility,
noting that this usually transpires with the concurrence of the sen-
tencing court.93 Targeting federal courts as its audience, this Bureau
document specifically encourages judges to consider alternative incar-
ceration for individuals that satisfy these general criteria and rein-
forces the preexisting understanding between the Bureau and federal
courts.
9 4
The existence of separate statutory instructions for the prerelease
component, as well as separate DOJ and Bureau guidance manuals for
this component, support two inferences: first, that any policy directive
89 Id. at 4-5.
90 Id. This section further states that failure of the inmate to make mandatory subsis-
tence payments of twenty-five percent of her earnings to the CCC may result in disciplinary
action or placement in a different facility. Id. at 4.
91 See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (2000).
92 See, e.g., Program Statement No. 7300.09, Fed. Bureau of Prisons & U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Community Corrections Manual, ch. 5, at 5-9 (May 19, 1999), http://www.bop.
gov//policy/progstat/7300 009.pdf.
93 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUDICIAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PetIS-
ONS 16 (2000) [hereinafterJuDIclAL RESOURCE GUIDE]. The Judicial Resource Guide suggests
that a typical offender in the community corrections component of a CCC carries a sen-
tence of six months or less and does not have a history of violent behavior, firearms of-
fenses, or sex crimes. Id.
94 See id. at 15-17.
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regarding a CCC must clearly designate the component it seeks to
regulate, and second, that it would be inappropriate to apply restric-
tions concerning the prerelease component more broadly to the com-
munity corrections component of CCCs or to CCCs generally. 95
II
THE DECEMBER 2002 MEMORANDUM: REINING IN ERRANT
BuREAU POWER OR LAWMAKING IN DISGUISE?
Writing on behalf of the Office of Legal Counsel to the DOJ,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General M. Edward Whelan III
asserted in a memorandum to the Deputy Attorney General in Decem-
ber 2002 that the Bureau "does not have general authority, either
upon the recommendation of the sentencing judge or otherwise, to
place... an offender in community confinement at the outset of his
sentence or to transfer him from prison to community confinement at
any time [the Bureau] chooses during the course of his sentence."96
The Memorandum argued that the Bureau's statutory authority to im-
plement sentences of imprisonment should, wherever possible, be in-
terpreted harmoniously with statutory requirements imposed upon
federal courts.97 In accordance with such "harmonious interpreta-
tion," the Memorandum concluded that the Bureau's practice con-
cerning direct placement in CCCs was "unlawful" on the grounds that
community confinement does not constitute "imprisonment"98 and
that the Bureau lacks the statutory authority to designate prisoners
directly to community confinement centers.99
From the outset, the Memorandum acknowledged the Bureau's
practice of placing "low-risk and nonviolent" offenders in a form of
community confinement for a short sentence of imprisonment.100
Suggesting, however, that the Bureau requested DOJ guidance con-
cerning its authority to designate such a placement, 10 1 the Memoran-
dum engaged in separate analyses of the statutory authority granted to
the federal courts and to the Bureau concerning sentencing. The
95 By analogy, one might infer that it would be inappropriate to suggest, as the DOJ
did, that the restrictions concerning prerelease placement as articulated in section 5C1.1
of the Guidelines should apply more broadly to CCCs, and thus should function as a re-
striction upon the Bureau's power to place individuals directly into the community compo-
nent of a CCC. See infra Parts II, III.B.1.
96 Memorandum, supra note 17, at 1.
97 Id. at 5-6.
98 Id. at 3.
99 Id. at 6-8.
100 Id. at 1.
101 See id. Several courts have noted that it seems disingenuous for the DOJ to suggest
that its guidance was requested in this instance. See, e.g., Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d
196, 205 n.9 (D. Mass. 2003).
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Memorandum's emphasis upon "clear general statutory authority"10 2
appears to set aside previous Bureau statements and guidance manu-
als, focusing instead upon statutory interpretation and the resultant
narrowing of the Bureau's discretion to designate imprisonment for
individuals sentenced by the courts.103
The Memorandum first examined whether the Guidelines grant
federal courts the authority to order individuals to serve any part of
their sentences in community confinement. 10 4 Following a brief his-
tory of the Guidelines and a discussion of the limited circumstances in
which judges might depart from them, 0 5 the Memorandum specifi-
cally addressed the terms of sections 5Cl.l (d) and (f) of the Guide-
lines and concluded that the plain language of section 5C1.1 did not
provide federal courts authority "to substitute community confine-
ment for any portion of the sentence" of Zone C or D defendants, the
individuals who require the most severe sentences. 10 6 The Memoran-
dum averred that federal courts of appeals cases have "uniformly de-
termined that community confinement does not constitute
'imprisonment"' for Zone C or D defendants, 10 7 and further insisted
upon distinguishing imprisonment and community confinement such
that community confinement could never be understood as a substi-
tute for imprisonment.108 In sum, the Memorandum asserted that
federal courts violate the Guidelines if they recommend community
confinement for any offender with a Zone C or D sentence. 09
Shifting its attention from the courts to the Bureau, the Memo-
randum's second section examined whether the Bureau, upon its own
initiative or upon judicial recommendation, might place Zone C or D
defendants in CCCs. 11 Contending that the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 not only commissioned the creation of the Guidelines, but
102 Memorandum, supra note 17, at 1.
1o See id. at 1-9.
104 Id. at 1-4.
105 Id. at 2 (noting that the court may depart from the Guidelines only where the
criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) are satisfied and is otherwise bound by the provi-
sions of the Guidelines (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996); Stinson v.
United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42 (1993))).
106 Id. at 3. The Memorandum asserts that Zone C sentences require the minimum
term to be satisfied "either by a simple 'sentence of imprisonment,'" as per section
5C1.1 (d)(1), or by a sentence including a "'term of supervised release with a condition
that substitutes community confinement or home detention,'" as per section 5C1.1(d) (2).
Id. at 2. Regarding Zone D sentences, the DOJ concluded that section 5C.1(f) requires
the "minimum term be satisfied by a simple sentence of imprisonment." Id.
107 Id. at 3 (contending that "'[i]mprisonment is the condition of being removed from
the community and placed in prison, whereas "community confinement" is the condition
of being controlled and restricted within the community"' (quoting United States v. Adler,
52 F.3d 20, 21 (2d Cir. 1995))).
108 See id.
109 Id. at 4.
110 Id.
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also "rewrote the provisions governing [the Bureau's] implementation
of sentences,"11' the Memorandum submitted that it was "especially
appropriate that [the Bureau's and courts' authority under Title 18]
be construed to produce a harmonious interpretation."' 12 The Mem-
orandum argued that this interpretation of the Bureau's authority sus-
tained Congress's overarching objective of eliminating arbitrary
disparities in punishment. 113 This general interpretation undoubt-
edly comported with the DOJ's insistence that this Memorandum did
not represent an arbitrary "policy" change, but rather a careful effort
to restrict Bureau discretion to the limits Congress intended. The
DOJ thus characterized its action as merely an interpretation of previ-
ous practice, rather than an effort to create a new administrative rule
with the effect of law in the absence of legally binding authority to do
so.
1 1 4
The DOJ's arguments naturally suggested two potential limita-
tions on the Bureau's authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3621, the Bureau's
authorizing statute.1 15 If, as the DOJ contended, placing prisoners di-
rectly in CCCs does not constitute imprisonment, the Bureau's act of
designating a prisoner directly to a CCC interferes with a court's sen-
tencing power, effectively replacing the court's sentence with a sen-
tence of the Bureau's own choosing. 116 In the alternative, temporarily
granting the argument that direct placement in CCCs does constitute
imprisonment, the DOJ contended that Bureau discretion cannot be
truly "unfettered."'1 17 In the spirit of harmonious interpretation, the
Memorandum insisted that the Bureau's power under § 3621 must be
restricted in accordance with the Guidelines. 118 The Memorandum
also argued that § 3621 was restricted by § 3624(c), which permits the
Bureau to transfer a prisoner to a prerelease program for a portion of
his sentence not to exceed six months or ten percent of his sen-
tence, 119 because § 3624(c) specifies the point in a prisoner's sen-
tence when the Bureau gains the authority to transfer a prisoner to a
CCC.120 Allowing the Bureau to have "unfettered discretion" to place
inmates in CCCs would, according to the DOJ, permit the Bureau to
111 Id. at 6.
112 Id.
113 Id,
114 See discussion infra Part III.B.
115 18 U.S.C. § 3621 (2000).
116 See Memorandum, supra note 17, at 6 ("[S] ection 3621(b) does not authorize [the
Bureau] to subvert that statutory scheme [that gives courts the authority to sentence pris-
oners] by placing in community confinement an offender who has received a sentence of
imprisonment.").
117 See id. at 7, 8 & n.8.
118 Id. at6.
119 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c).
120 See Memorandum, supra note 17, at 7.
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nullify these statutory restrictions and to extend the Bureau's sphere
of influence far beyond that which Congress intended.'12
The crux of the Memorandum's revised policy lies in the DOJ's
position that CCCs are not places of imprisonment "within the ordi-
nary meaning of that phrase."' 2 2 The Memorandum criticized that
CCC residents, "although still in federal custody," are not confined to
a CCC for the entire day, but rather are permitted to leave for employ-
ment, training, and education. 123 The Memorandum recounted that
inmates in CCCs normally become eligible for weekend and evening
leave passes after the second week of confinement, criticizing that
such provisions are incongruous with traditional conceptions of incar-
ceration.1 24 Reasoning that if confinement in a CCC is not imprison-
ment, then the Bureau cannot place a prisoner in one under § 3621,
the Memorandum formally concluded that the Bureau lacks statutory
authority to place a Zone C or D offender directly in community
confinement.1 25
III
INTERPRETATION OR RULE? UNMASKING THE DOJ's "POLICY"
ON PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
Under the guidance of the APA, courts apply different levels of
deference to administrative rules depending on their classification as
interpretive rules or substantive rules. 126 Thus, in order to under-
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. While facilitating an inmate's transition to society through training programs in
an effort to curb recidivism, the prerelease component is still considered imprisonment by
the Guidelines and is credited toward an inmate's imprisonment term. See U.S. SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.1 cmt. n.4(B) (2001) ("[The court] may impose a sentence
of imprisonment that includes a term of supervised release with a condition requiring com-
munity confinement or home detention." (emphasis added)). The DOJ's argument, sug-
gesting that permission to leave for educational and training purposes fundamentally
contradicts the traditional conception of imprisonment, does not comport with the prer-
elease component. See Memorandum, supra note 17, at 7. On one hand, under the prer-
elease component, the DOJ treats placement in a CCC as imprisonment, properly
crediting prison time; on the other hand, the DOJ suggests that time in the community
corrections component, which is in fact more restrictive, does not constitute imprison-
ment. See id. at 5, 7; discussion infra Part IV.A.
124 Memorandum, supra note 17, at 7. Again, the Memorandum appears to confuse
the two components of CCC programs, extrapolating that options available to those indi-
viduals in the prerelease component are available to all residing in a CCC. See id.; Program
Statement No. 7310.04, supra note 13, at 4-5 (delineating between the prelease and com-
munity corrections components of a CCC).
125 See Memorandum, supra note 17, at 8-9.
126 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000) (specifying that traditional rulemaking procedures are
not necessary for "interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency or-
ganization, procedure, or practice"); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)
(establishing the appropriate level of deference courts should grant to agency
interpretations).
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stand whether APA requirements bind the DOJ's new "policy" and
what deference the court must apply when evaluating the reasonable-
ness of the DOJ's action, an effort must be made to determine
whether the "policy" constitutes an interpretive rule or a substantive
rule. 12 7 An agency's assertion that its actions constitute an interpreta-
tion is not determinative.1 28 Instead, the proper question is whether
the DOJ's reinterpretation of § 3621 is fairly encompassed within the
statute or whether it introduces new rights or duties. t29
A. Rules, Interpretations, and Hazarding the Smog1 30 to Discern
the Difference
Administrative law affords the DOJ, in its capacity as the federal
agency overseeing Bureau procedure and practice, the power to make
reasonable interpretive choices concerning the statutes it administers
without judicial interference. 31 The Supreme Court aptly noted in
United States v. Mead Corp. that
[i]mplementation of a statute may occur in formal adjudication or
the choice to defend against judicial challenge; it may occur in a
central board or office or in dozens of enforcement agencies dotted
across the country; its institutional lawmaking may be confined to
the resolution of minute detail or extend to legislative rulemaking
on matters intentionally left by Congress to be worked out at the
agency level. 132
Regardless of the form that implementation of a statute may take,
however, it is vulnerable to substantive and procedural review by the
courts.133
Holding agencies to due-process standards that appear judicial in
nature,134 the APA matches a set of procedures to each type of rule or
agency action with the objective of "assur[ing] informed administra-
127 See infra notes 128-46 (discussing the consequences classifying a rule as a substan-
tive or interpretive). But cf Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 93-94 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (discussing the difficulty courts face in attempting to determine whether a rule is
interpretive or substantive).
128 Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
129 See Air Transport Ass'n of Am., Inc., v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 291 F.3d 49, 55 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).
130 See Anthony, supra note 2, at 4 n.13.
131 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001). The Supreme Court
approved the Bureau as the proper interpreter of the sentence-related statutes. See Reno v.
Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 60 (1995) (noting that the Bureau is the proper agency to interpret the
Bail Reform Act).
132 See 533 U.S. at 236.
133 See5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
134 See, e.g., Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administra-
tive, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 95, 111 (2003).
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tive action and adequate protection to private interests."1 3 5 The level
of judicial intervention into agency action mirrors each rule's level of
formality, making classification of each agency action critically impor-
tant.13 6 The APA, however, defines the term "rule" very broadly and
does not distinguish between substantive and legislative rules,13 7 a dis-
tinction often characterized as "enshrouded in considerable smog."'138
Courts have treated substantive rules that comply with extensive APA
requirements for notice and comment with a high level of deference,
known as Chevron deference, and have refrained from interfering so
long as the rule does not contradict the clear meaning of the statute
or the clear intent of Congress and so long as the interpretation is
reasonable. 139 Regarding interpretative rules, a broad category of
agency action that lacks the force of law' 40 and does not have to meet
the APA requirements of notice and comment, courts have tradition-
ally employed the lower level of deference the Supreme Court applied
in Skidmore, which essentially grants the interpretative rule only per-
suasive authority. 41
The procedures that comprise an agency's rulemaking process re-
veal the proper classification of the agency's actions. The APA defini-
tion of rulemaking, the "agency process for formulating, amending,
or repealing a rule," 142 generally applies to substantive rules that im-
plement a statute over which an agency has interpretive authority and
that bear the force and effect of law.143 Seeking to ensure all inter-
ested parties an opportunity to offer guidance and raise concerns, 144
the APA mandates that an agency explain the reasons for its actions
135 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 31 (Win. W. Gaunt & Sons 1973) (1947) [hereinafter ATrORNEY GENERAL'S
MANUAL]; see 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RicHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA-
TISE § 6.10, at 282 (3d ed. 1994) ("The agency typically is in a superior position to deter-
mine what it intended when it issued a rule, how and when it intended the rule to apply,
and the interpretation of the rule that makes the most sense given the agency's purposes in
issuing the rule. Courts have significant institutional disadvantages in attempting to re-
solve these critical issues.").
136 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944).
137 See5 U.S.C. § 551 (4).
138 See Anthony, supra note 2, at 4 & n.13.
139 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984).
140 This broad category of agency actions includes opinion letters, guidance manuals,
and policy statements. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
141 See 323 U.S. at 140 (noting that rulings, interpretations, and opinions, "while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experi-
ence and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance").
142 5 U.S.C. § 551(5).
143 See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (citing ATrro'EY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 135, at 30 n.3).
144 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
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regardless of whether its action enacts, amends, or repeals a rule. 145
Rulemaking thus requires an agency to demonstrate that it has "venti-
lated" all major issues of policy. 146
Because the APA exempts interpretive rules from the notice and
comment procedures required for substantive rules, 147 interpretive
rules permit agencies to immediately assume responsibility for inter-
preting legislation without managing lengthy notice and comment
procedures.148 In contrast to substantive rules, interpretive rules "ad-
vise the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules
which it administers" 149 and do not bear the force and effect of law. 150
Interpretive rules explain, but do not supplement, existing substantive
law.15 ' By designating an action with the label "interpretive rule," an
agency not only exempts itself from APA requirements, but also for-
mally asserts that the interpretation does not project a new legal effect
of its own.152 As such, an agency that labels its action an "interpretive
rule" implicitly announces that its action reasonably falls within the
umbrella of an existing regulation. As the Supreme Court specified in
Skidmore, the weight of such an interpretation in court depends upon
the "thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its rea-
soning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control." 153
Apart from procedural and philosophical distinctions, the funda-
mental factor distinguishing substantive and interpretive rules centers
on "whether the interpretation itself carries the 'force and effect of
law' or rather whether it spells out a duty fairly encompassed within
145 See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (5). The APA requires a published notice in the Federal Register, as
well as a period of comment that gives "interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without
opportunity for oral presentation." Id. § 553(c). The agency must incorporate these com-
ments in a "concise general statement of their basis or purpose," publicly demonstrating
that the agency proceeded as a reasonable decision-maker. Id.
146 See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir.
1977).
147 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
148 See Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Interpretive
rules preserve agencies' flexibility to act more freely and efficiently where substantive
rights are not in question. See id.; Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal
Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 159, 162 (2000) (commenting on the
general notion that an "issue will graduate to a more formal process of rulemaking or
adjudication" if there is substantial disagreement concerning a regulation).
149 Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1109 (citing ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra
note 135, at 30 n.3).
150 See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995).
151 See Nat'l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 236-37
(D.C. Cir. 1992); Anthony, supra note 2, at 13.
152 See Anthony, supra note 2, at 13.
153 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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the regulation that the interpretation purports to construe." 154 In
part, one may determine whether a rule is substantive or interpretive
based on how closely the agency tied its interpretation to the actual
language of the statute or regulation the rule interprets.155 On these
grounds, an interpretation of general terms in a statute, such as "equi-
table" or "fair," is likely to be a substantive rule that introduces a new
right or duty with legal effect. 156 An interpretation based upon more
specific wording, without which the government could arguably rely
on the regulation itself and reach the same outcome, is likely to be a
proper interpretive rule exempt from APA notice and comment re-
quirements. 157 This linguistic analysis assists one in assessing whether
an interpretation merely "spells out a duty fairly encompassed within
the [statute or] regulation,"' 58 or whether the interpretation strays
outside the confines of the statute or regulation with the force and
effect of law.' 59
A more substantive test of whether an interpretation is "fairly en-
compassed" within the statute or regulation may be whether the par-
ties, in the absence of the agency's interpretation, would have
adequate legislative guidance to perform their duties. 160 Substantial
deviation from previous interpretations, even those previously charac-
terized as "fairly encompassed" within the substantive regulation, may
also suggest that an interpretation actually supplements the law by im-
posing new rights or duties. 16 1 Put another way, the test of an inter-
pretive rule may be whether its meaning is "self-evident in the statute"
and whether the rule still permits parties to exercise their own discre-
tion. 162 On these grounds, the fate of the DOJ Memorandum's proce-
dural and substantive validity rests on whether it is a "mere effort at
interpretive guidance" or a "rulemaking exercise designed to reshape
154 Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(quoting Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1109).
155 See id.
156 Id.
157 See id.
158 Id.
159 See id.
160 See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
161 See Shalala v. Guernsey Mern'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 100 (1995) (commenting that
rulemaking is required where an interpretation "adopt[s] a new position inconsistent with
... existing regulations"); Alaska Prof'l Hunters Ass'n v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 177 F.3d
1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("When an agency has given its regulation a definitive inter-
pretation, and later significantly revises that interpretation, the agency has in effect
amended its rule, something it may not accomplish without notice and comment.").
162 Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 212-13 (D. Mass. 2003) (suggesting that a
rule that binds the agency and third parties is substantive rather than interpretive).
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the scope of a statutory provision through an administrative statement
of lawmaking." 163
B. The DOJ "Policy": A Substantive Rule in Disguise
1. The DOJ's Interpretations are Misguided and Not Fairly
Encompassed Within 18 US.C. § 3621
Despite the DOJ's insistence that it merely reinterpreted § 3621,
the Memorandum clearly strayed outside of the broad language of
§ 3621 and "drastically truncate [s] [the Bureau's] discretion in a man-
ner that is in no way 'outlined' in the applicable statute." 164 The Mem-
orandum consistently disregarded the distinction between CCCs' two
separate components, treating the community corrections and prer-
elease components as one. 165 In so doing, the Memorandum not only
misinterpreted the DOJ's own documents, 66 but fundamentally rein-
terpreted the plain terms of § 3621 and improperly stretched the
terms of the Guidelines to limit the Bureau's discretion. 167 The Mem-
orandum did not outline an interpretation "in the absence of [which]
there would... be an adequate legislative basis ... to ensure perform-
ance of duties. 1 68 Quite to the contrary, the Bureau consistently
placed prisoners in the community corrections component of CCCs
for over forty years without the assistance of this interpretation. 169
Collectively, these factors illustrate that the Memorandum formulated
a substantive rule, one that is invalid for failing to comply with
mandatory APA notice and comment procedures. 170
The Memorandum departed from the plain terms of § 3621 by
declaring that CCCs do not qualify as penal or correctional facilities
and that placing prisoners in CCCs is therefore unlawful. 171 The
Memorandum circumvents § 3621's broad instruction that "[t]he Bu-
reau may designate ... any available penal or correctional facility,"' 72
163 See Mallory v. United States, No. Civ.A. 03-10220-DPW, 2003 WL 1563764, at *2 (D.
Mass. Mar. 25, 2003) (holding that the DOJ Memorandum was procedurally invalid for
failure to comply with notice and comment, but reserving judgment on the substantive
merits of the Memorandum).
164 See lacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1039 (D. Mass. 2003).
165 See supra discussion supra Part I.C.2.
166 See id.; infra Part IV.C.
167 See supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text (discussing the Memorandum's at-
tempts to use the Guidelines to restrict the Bureau's discretion to designate prisoners to
penal or correctional institutions under 18 U.S.C. § 3621); supra notes 53-55 (noting that
the Guidelines were intended to bind the federal courts only).
168 See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C.
Cir. 1993); supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
170 The DOJ made no effort to comply with the APA's notice and comment proce-
dures for substantive rules, mandated by 5 U.SC. § 553. See discussion supra Part II.
171 See discussion infra Part [V.A.
172 18 US.C. § 3621(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
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arguing instead that a CCC does not constitute a form of imprison-
ment by virtue of the fact that it releases prisoners for employment
and related programs. 173 The general terms of § 3621, however, do
not delimit the Bureau's discretion in such a manner. 174
Kathleen Hawk Sawyer underscored the Bureau's traditional in-
terpretation of § 3621 during a 1996 interview in which she en-
couraged judges to visit institutions and consider all forms of
incarceration, noting that the Bureau's mission is to
place offenders at facilities providing appropriate security that are
as close as possible to their homes, to maintain balance in the in-
mate population throughout the system, and to use [Bureau] re-
sources wisely by ensuring that inmates requiring only low security
are not housed in higher security institutions that cost more to
operate. 175
Reinforcing this notion, as several courts aptly noted, imprisonment
does not require "that all those in custody of the [Bureau] must be
confined in structures resembling Alcatraz or Sing Sing,"' 76 nor does
a penal facility necessitate "barbed wire and absolute constraints on
liberty-and nothing else. ' 177 Rather, the language of § 3621 itself
"rules out almost no imaginable facility or institution, publicly or pri-
vately owned. '178
The Memorandum fundamentally misinterprets the scope of the
Guidelines and misapplies restrictions that were intended to bind only
judges.179 The Memorandum relies heavily upon section 5C1.1 of the
Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3624 to suggest that placement in a CCC
does not constitute imprisonment, insisting that these statutes' pre-
scriptions concerning the prerelease component of CCCs apply gener-
ally to CCCs as a whole. 80 The DOJ's efforts to disregard the
distinction between the prerelease and community corrections com-
ponents is particularly ironic, given that the DOJ's official documents
instruct judges that these components are distinct. 181 The Guidelines
never address the Bureau as their intended audience, nor do they dis-
173 See Memorandum, supra note 17, at 7.
174 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
175 See An Interview with Bureau of Prisons Director Kathleen M. Hawk, supra note 8.
176 Byrd v. Moore, 252 F. Supp. 2d 293, 301 (W.D.N.C. 2003).
177 Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 206 (D. Mass. 2003).
178 See Byrd, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 301.
179 See sura notes 53-55 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's intent that the
Guidelines bind only judges); see also Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 525 (M.D.
La. 2003) (criticizing that the DOJ has, "with respect to sentencing discretion, assigned the
judiciary and the Bureau as bunkmates under the guidance of the Sentencing Commis-
sion's camp counselor").
180 See Memorandum, supra note 17, at 6-7.
181 See, e.g., Program Statement No. 7310.04, supra note 13, at 4 (stating that a "CCC
meets the definition of a 'penal or correctional facility'" and that the community correc-
tions component is a restrictive form of confinement).
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cuss the community corrections component of CCCs. t8 2 Thus, even
without examining the precedential value of the DOJ's previous repre-
sentations, i8 3 it is clear that the Memorandum's reliance upon gui-
dance outside of the plain terms of the statute cannot be "fairly
encompassed" within 18 U.S.C. § 3621.
2. The DOJ Masks a New Legal Effect Under the Veil of an
Interpretive Rule
The Memorandum imposes rights or obligations "'the basic tenor
of which [are] not already outlined in the law itself" ,1 8 4 and therefore
constitutes a substantive rule with the force and effect of law. The
DOJ's characterization of this action as an interpretive rule or "policy"
stands in sharp contrast to over forty years of reliance on the plain
terms of § 3621.185 By contrast, Bureau and DOJ documents, gui-
dance manuals to federal courts, and representations to Congress
prior to December 2002 more aptly illustrate guidance that is encom-
passed within the statute itself.
The statutory and legislative history of § 3621, as well as its prede-
cessor statute, § 4082, supports the argument that the language and
intent of § 3621 are unambiguous. Several factors are particularly tell-
ing in this analysis. First, a 1965 amendment to the predecessor stat-
ute, adding the term "facility" after the term "institution," specifically
defined the term "facility" to include a "residential community treat-
ment center."18 6 Legislative history highlights the continuity between
§ 4082 and § 3621, stating that § 3261(b) permitted the Bureau to
designate prisoners to appropriate facilities upon considering speci-
fied factors187 and did not intend to change preexisting law concern-
ing the breadth of the Bureau's authority.1 88 Nonetheless, the DOJ
Memorandum selectively interpreted "minor statutory changes" to in-
troduce a policy that "[b]y all accounts ... would alter a sentencing
landscape that existed long before the Sentencing Guidelines hit the
scene."
189
182 See supra text accompanying notes 53-54, 71-72.
183 See discussion infra Part IV.C.
184 Iacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1039 (D. Mass. 2003) (quoting La
Casa Del Convaleciente v. Sullivan, 965 F.2d 1175, 1178 (1st Cir. 1992)); see Shalala v.
Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 100 (1995) (indicating that an agency effectively
amends the substance of a statute when it "adopt[s] a new position inconsistent with any of
the [agency's] existing regulations," regardless of whether the agency acknowledges such a
change).
185 See supra notes 9, 78-81 and accompanying text.
186 lacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1025. The court also notes that "residential community
treatment center" is an older name for "community confinement center." Id.
187 See id. (citing S. REP. 98-225, at 141-42 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3324).
188 See id. (citing McCarthy v. Doe, 146 F.3d 118, 123 n.2 (2d Cir. 1998)).
189 See Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 545 (M.D. La. 2003).
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If Congress had wanted to restrict the Bureau's discretion, it had
ample opportunity to amend the old law, to insert this specification in
§ 3621, or to provide commentary to this end. 90 Similarly, the Com-
mission might have issued a policy statement specifically restricting
the Bureau's practices concerning CCC placement.' 91 Neither Con-
gress nor the Commission have ever issued such statements or gui-
dance.1 92 To the contrary, only ten years prior to the DOJ
Memorandum in question, the DOJ itself published a document indi-
cating that § 3621 (b) offers no statutory basis for distinguishing be-
tween residential community facilities and secure facilities or for
limiting the Bureau's designation authority based on legal history. 193
Taken together, the broad wording of § 3621 (b), the explicit wording
of the predecessor statute § 4082, the legislative history indicating
continuity between the two, and the lack of objection by the Commis-
sion or Congress over several generations 194 only serve to strengthen
the conclusion that Congress did not intend to restrict the Bureau's
authority to designate inmates for direct placement in CCCs.
The DOJ Memorandum thus binds the Bureau to a new interpre-
tation bearing the force of law, all the while ignoring "the positive au-
thorization given the [Bureau] to consider any appropriate facility, as
well as the complete absence of any hint of a prohibition" against au-
thorizing placement in a CCC.195 Under the preexisting practice,
judges' recommendations concerning CCCs did not bind the Bu-
reau's discretion; the Bureau always retained the power to disregard a
judge's recommendation. 96 The Memorandum, however, removed
all Bureau discretion concerning direct CCC placement, 197 setting
190 See id. at 546; lacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d. at 1025.
191 See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (5) (2000) (directing the Bureau to consider policy state-
ments issued by the Commission).
192 See Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 207 (D. Mass. 2003) (noting that the
Commission never addressed "issues concerning the place of confinement"); lacaboni, 251
F. Supp. 2d at 1025, 1027 (stating that the Commission "could easily have condemned the
practice [of CCC placement]," and noting that "[i] n fact, the ... Commission has never so
much as hinted that the.., well established practice was 'unlawful'"); Howard, 248 F. Supp.
2d at 546 ("[F]ar from explicitly overriding that known practice-as of course it was and is
within the power of Congress to do-the Crime Control Act of 1984 left that practice in
place . . ").
193 See lacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1027 (citing 16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 65 (1992),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/quinlan.15.htm).
194 See id. at 1025-26.
195 Id. at 1026.
196 As a matter of practice, however, the Bureau usually complied with a court's recom-
mendation. See An Interview with Bureau of Prisons Director Kathleen M. Hawk, supra note 8
(indicating that the Bureau generally followed eighty percent ofjudicial recommendations
concerning the placement of inmates); see also supra text accompanying notes 34, 84.
197 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 290 F.3d 377, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (sug-
gesting that a statement that automatically restricts a decision-maker's proper discretion is
a binding statement, which creates rights or obl;gations); Chamber of Commerce v. U.S.
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forth "a uniform, predetermined outcome that admits of no excep-
tion."' 98 The DOJ's "policy" denied the Bureau the fundamental dis-
cretion that it had exercised for over forty years' 99 and which
Congress granted to it in the broad language of § 3621.200 Removing
the Bureau's long-standing discretion to designate inmates directly to
CCCs indicates that the Memorandum introduced a substantive rule
with the effect of law, not merely an interpretive rule.20'
3. The "Policy" is Procedurally Invalid for Failure to Comply with
APA Requirements
The APA prescribes that when formulating, amending, or repeal-
ing a rule, an agency must comply with mandatory due-process re-
quirements. 20 2 The APA prohibits the DOJ from introducing a rule
with the force and effect of law without first inviting the comments of
all interested persons and responding to their rational inquiries.20 3
Despite the DOJ's insistence upon labeling the Memorandum an in-
terpretive rule, the Memorandum strays far beyond the language and
intentions of § 3621. A rule that departs from the plain meaning of
the statute, relies upon other statutes in search of "harmonious inter-
pretation," 20 4 and is not "fairly encompassed" within the existing stat-
ute205 cannot purport to merely provide guidance for agency decision-
making. It is undisputed that the DOJ failed to comply with notice
and comment procedures for substantive rules as outlined in 5 U.S.C.
§ 553.206 On these grounds, the DOJ Memorandum is procedurally
invalid. 207
Dep't of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (commenting that a rule is binding
where it "leaves no room for discretionary choices" by agency employees).
198 See Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 214 (D. Mass. 2003).
199 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
200 See discussion supra Part IB; infra Part IV.A.
201 Ashkenazi v. Att'y Gen., 246 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 n.9 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding that where
the new policy is "not flexible and does not permit [the Bureau] to exercise any discre-
tion," it has the force of law and is "not merely interpretive"), vacated as moot, 346 F.3d 191
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
202 See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2000); discussion supra Part III.A.
203 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); Mallory v. United States, No. Civ.A. 03-10220-DPW, 2003
WL 1563764, at *2 (D. Mass. Mar. 25, 2003) (opining that the Memorandum "is no mere
effort at interpretive guidance but rather a rulemaking exercise designed to reshape the
scope of a statutory provision through an administrative statement of lawmaking").
204 See Memorandum, supra note 17, at 6.
205 See supra Part III.B.1.
206 See supra Part II.
207 A determination of procedural invalidity does not imply that the DOJ lacks the
power to reverse its original interpretation. Rather, if the DOJ wants to reintroduce this
policy, it must comply with APA requirements for rulemaking. See discussion infra Part
IV.B-C.
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IV
ASSESSING THE REASONABLENESS OF THE DOJ's "POLICY" AS
AN INTERPRETIVE RULE THROUGH MEAD AND SKIDMORE
Even if the DOJ properly classified the Memorandum as an inter-
pretive rule, thereby securing its procedural validity by avoiding APA
requirements, this label does not shield the DOJ "policy" from judicial
scrutiny. Indeed, although the DOJ Memorandum averred that its re-
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3621 corrects a mistaken interpretation,
precedent is unsettled concerning whether additional process is due
for reinterpretations of long-standing, documented policy. 20 8 Fur-
ther, the label of "interpretive rule" exposes the DOJ's "policy" to a
more searching judicial review for reasonableness, since the rule was
not vetted through a notice and comment process.20 9 A court may
substitute its own interpretation for an agency's in the case of inter-
pretive rules on the grounds that the court's view is more reasona-
ble. 210 As such, interpretive rules have the power to persuade, but not
to control or bind, the court.2 11 Thus, a court must determine
whether the DOJ "policy," even if properly classified as an interpretive
rule, is nonetheless either procedurally or substantively invalid.
As the final authority concerning statutory construction, 212 courts
face a complicated balancing act when assessing interpretive rules.
On one hand, they must assess whether "Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue" 21 3 or whether Congress delegated to
the agency the authority to regulate a gap between two statutes or
rules.2 14 On the other hand, carefully weighing an individual agency's
expertise and track record, courts must also assess whether the agency
acted with the proper degree of care based on the "consistency, for-
mality, and relative expertness, and [ ] the persuasiveness of the
agency's position."2 15
208 See, e.g., Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (suggesting that once an agency releases an interpretation of a regulation, if it
makes any substantive changes to the interpretation, the agency should follow the same
procedures required to "formally modify the regulation itself: . .. the process of notice and
comment").
209 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944) (noting that interpretive rules
"do not constitute an interpretation of [an] Act or a standard for judging factual situations
which binds a . . .court's processes").
210 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984) ("The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must
reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.").
211 See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
212 Cheuron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
213 Id. at 842.
214 See id. at 843-44; United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
215 Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (citations omitted); Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (noting that the
"weight [accorded to an administrative] judgment... will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
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Part IV will first employ traditional tools of statutory construction
to assess whether Congress answered the precise issue in question:216
whether a CCC constitutes punishment. Further, it will evaluate the
breadth of authority Congress delegated to the DOJ to regulate Bu-
reau policy. Finding that Congress purposefully defined punishment
in a very broad manner and did not restrict the Bureau's judgment to
designate inmates' imprisonment, Part IV will then study the prece-
dential value of earlier Bureau and DOJ documents that directly con-
tradict the policy espoused in the Memorandum. It will discuss the
unsettled precedent concerning whether reinterpretations, even legit-
imate ones, require additional due-process procedures. Part IV will
conclude that the DOJ Memorandum is unreasonable and both pro-
cedurally and substantively invalid.
A. Understanding the Plain Meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3621:
Punishment and CCCs Defined
The Bureau's "policy," as outlined in the DOJ Memorandum,
does not comport with the plain meaning of § 3621. Relying on the
textual analysis of four courts, which determined that they had juris-
diction to hear appeals of the DOJ's administrative decision, 21 7 this
Note concludes that the common usage and dictionary definitions of
the terms of the statute, as well as its relevant legislative history,
demonstrate that Congress crafted a purposefully broad definition of
imprisonment that comfortably includes CCCs. This Note opines that
the DOJ Memorandum not only mischaracterized the history of CCCs
but also placed undue emphasis on the Guidelines in support of its
"policy,"218 and misinterpreted their intended scope. 219
The text of § 3621 (a) unequivocally grants the Bureau custody of
a "person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment. '" 220
The statute further specifies that "[t]he Bureau may designate any
available penal or correctional facility that meets minimum standards of
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control").
216 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
217 See Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 205 (D. Mass. 2003); lacaboni v. United
States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1035-36 (D. Mass. 2003); Byrd v. Moore, 252 F. Supp. 2d 293,
297 (W.D.N.C. 2003); Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 534 (M.D. La. 2003); supra
note 35 and accompanying text (discussing that many courts dismissed cases on the
grounds that the petitioners had not exhausted their administrative remedies).
218 See Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1024 (commenting that the DOJ's analysis, begin-
ning "with a comer of the Sentencing Guidelines, then working backwards to the control-
ling general statute," utilizes "a clever rhetorical tactic, [but] begins the wrong way
around").
219 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
220 18 U.S.C. § 3621 (a) (2000); see Monahan, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 205-07; Byrd, 252 F.
Supp. 2d at 300-01.
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health and habitability established by the Bureau."22 1 Surmising that
"[i] t could not be clearer from [the language of § 3621] that Congress
granted the Bureau a rather broad discretion to appoint the places
where prisoners will serve their terms of imprisonment," the court in
Howard v. Ashcrofl opined that "the only apparent limitation on the
Bureau is that it choose a place that is a 'penal or correctional facil-
ity.' "222 Reinforcing this characterization, the court in Byrd v. Moore
contended that the language of § 3621 "rules out almost no imagina-
ble facility or institution, public or privately owned." 2 23
Looking to dictionaries for technical guidance, at least two courts
concluded that the terms "penal" and "correctional" do not limit Bu-
reau discretion concerning CCC placement, but rather embrace the
traditional conception of CCC placement, both in principle and in
practice.2 24 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, something is
properly characterized as "penal" if it is any of the following:
Of, pertaining to, or relating to punishment. (a.) Having as its ob-
ject the infliction of punishment, punitive; prescribing or enacting
the punishment to be inflicted for an offence or transgression....
(e.) Used or appointed as a place of punishment. (f.) Involving,
connected with, or characterized by, a penalty or legal punishment.
(g.) Of, pertaining to, or subject to the penal laws, penal servitude,
etc.2 2
5
Similarly, the American Heritage Dictionary defines "penal" as "relating
to, or prescribing punishment, as for breaking the law. Subject to
punishment; legally punishable: a penal offense. Serving as or constitut-
ing a means or place of punishment. '" 22 6 Although the Oxford English
Dictionary is not instructive concerning the definition of "correc-
tional," defining it as "[o]f or pertaining to correction; corrective,"' 227
the American Heritage Dictionary directs that the term "correctional"
means "[p]unishment intended to rehabilitate or improve."22 8
These definitions do not mandate the type of rigid restrictions
the Memorandum emphasized. Rather than focusing on the specific
221 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (emphasis added); see Byrd, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 300 ("Section
3621 endows the [Bureau] with considerable discretion to designate prisoners anywhere
the [Bureau] decides is appropriate . ").
222 248 F. Supp. 2d at 538. As the court noted, no party, including the DOJ, has ques-
tioned the Bureau's discretion to set minimum standards of health and habitability. See id.
223 252 F. Supp. 2d at 301.
224 See, e.g., Monahan, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 206-08 (D. Mass. 2003); Byrd, 252 F. Supp. 2d.
at 300-02.
225 Howard, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 538 (quoting XI OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 460 (2d
ed. 1989)).
226 Id. (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1298 (4th
ed. 2000)).
227 Id. at 539 (quoting III OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 962 (2d ed. 1989)).
228 Id. (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 411 (4th
ed. 2000)).
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nature of a facility or, for example, requiring restrictive confinement
without exception, these definitions characterize punishment as the
deprivation of one's liberty for some period of time on account of a
legal process. This plain-language analysis embraces CCCs as penal or
correctional facilities purporting to punish, correct, and rehabilitate
their inmates. 229 Indeed, the "plain language of § 3621 obviously cov-
ers a community confinement facility, and no whisper of anything to
the contrary can be found anywhere, in anything Congress has
said." 230
The courts' reflections on the nature and purpose of punishment
endorse the definitions noted above and stand in direct contrast to
the DOJ's conception of prison as a very specific place, "with barbed
wire and absolute constraints on liberty-and nothing else."231 The
court in Iacaboni noted that " [i] n a modern penal system, it is the rare
prisoner who is immured behind six-foot-thick walls 365 days a years
[sic] like some character out of a Dumas romance, '"232 commenting
that the statutes themselves make alternate provisions such as the
prerelease component and provisions for training and education dur-
ing imprisonment.23 3 The court in Byrd v. Moore agreed that permit-
ting an offender outside of the physical confinement of a Bureau
facility is not fundamentally inconsistent with the concept of imprison-
ment,234 arguing that "[s]ection 3621 certainly does not impose such
a limitation on the [Bureau's] discretion. '235 On these grounds, the
DOJ Memorandum's more restricted view of incarceration is not only
out of step with previous Bureau practice, but also out of step with the
plain language of the Bureau's enacting statute.
Section 3551 (b) articulates only three categories of authorized
sentences for individuals: a term of probation, a fine, and a term of
imprisonment.236 This statute's simple sentencing structure does not
classify community confinement or other alternative placements as
anything other than sentences of imprisonment. 237 The Oxford English
Dictionary defines "imprisonment" as "[t] he action of imprisoning, or
fact or condition of being imprisoned; detention in a prison or place
of confinement; close or irksome confinement; 'forcible restraint
within bounds'; incarceration. '" 23 8 Similarly, the American Heritage Dic-
229 See discussion supra Part I.C.
230 lacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1025 (D. Mass. 2003).
231 See Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 206 (D. Mass. 2003).
232 lacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1029 (D. Mass. 2003).
233 See id.
234 252 F. Supp. 2d 293, 301 (W.D.N.C. 2003).
235 Id.
236 See 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (2000).
237 See lacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1024.
238 Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 540 (M.D. La. 2003) (quoting VII OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 746 (2d. ed. 1989)).
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tionary defines "imprisonment" as "[t]o put in or as if in prison; con-
fine."2 39 In finding that CCCs meet these definitions, the Howard
court emphasized that the community corrections component per-
mits inmates to leave only for employment and selected, individually
approved tasks, restricting inmates to the confines of the CCC at all
other times. 240 The Monahan court suggested that "§ 3621 (a) . . . ar-
guably provides the closest thing to a definition of 'imprisonment' as
one can find in the United States Code" by requiring that "' [a] person
who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment... shall be commit-
ted to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons until the expiration of the term
imposed.' '"241 The Monahan court thus contended that custody,
rather than a particular locale, defines "imprisonment," finding that
this "conceptual distinction ... is consistent with long-accepted views
on this subject."242 Holding that "the critical litmus is whether offend-
ers 'always remain subject to the control of the Bureau,'"243 the Jacaboni
court agreed, concluding that Bureau custody is the "touchstone of
'imprisonment.' "244
Building upon this broad-based analysis, the Howard court as-
sessed the definition of CCCs and suggested that the term "halfway
house," generally used to characterize CCCs, may itself be mislead-
ing.24 5 Noting that not all CCC inmates are "halfway between jail and
home," Howard contends that the term "halfway house" "elides a dis-
tinction" between the prerelease and community corrections compo-
nents offered by CCCs. 246 Using the term "CCC" in place of "halfway
house," the court acknowledged that CCCs are designed as a restric-
tive option punishing an inmate for a period of time, but allowing
limited privileges, including leave for employment.2 47 Although un-
doubtedly less confining than conventional prisons, CCCs "impose
heavily on the freedom of inmates."2 48 Indeed, the "degree of confine-
239 Id. (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 882 (4th
ed. 2000)).
240 See id. (noting, for example, that although Ms. Howard was permitted to travel to
herjob five days per week and received limited one- to three-hour passes to visit her family
or attend counseling or religious services, she was otherwise confined in a CCC, and stating
that this qualified as "confinement as most people would understand it").
241 Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 206 (D. Mass. 2003) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3621 (a)).
242 Id. (citing Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 63-65 (1995), which held that the issue of
Bureau custody is controlling-specifically, that community confinement under Bureau
custody entities an inmate to sentencing credit, but that residence in such a facility when
released from Bureau custody does not receive such credit).
243 See lacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1029 (D. Mass. 2003) (quoting
Koray, 515 U.S. at 63).
244 Id.; see Monahan, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 206.
245 See Howard, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 522 n.13.
246 Id.; see supra Part I.C (discussing the two separate components of CCCs).
247 Howard, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 523 n.13.
248 Id. at 541.
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ment is not determinative of whether. . . inmates are confined";2 49
CCCs properly commit inmates to the custody of the Bureau and re-
strict them to a facility designed to punish and rehabilitate. Bureau
program statements, as noted in Part I.C.2, confirm this analysis and
emphasize the restrictive nature of the community corrections compo-
nent of CCCs.
By enumerating in § 3621 (b) several factors for the Bureau to
consider,250 Congress not only permitted the Bureau to designate pris-
oners to the community corrections component of the CCC on its
own initiative, but also specifically instructed the Bureau to consider
"any statement by the court.., recommending a type of penal or correc-
tional facility as appropriate." 251 As such, it is utterly incongruous for
the DOJ to contend that § 3624(c) and section 5C1.1 of the Guide-
lines direct the Bureau to designate inmates to CCCs' prerelease com-
ponents for ten percent of their total sentences, crediting the time
spent there as part of their imprisonment,2 52 yet on the other hand to
argue that direct placement in a CCC does not constitute imprison-
ment.253 In so doing, the DOJ appears to elide the distinctions be-
tween CCC components in some circumstances and yet to
differentiate certain CCC practices at other times. Such inconsistent
and opportunistic analysis fails to offset Congress's unambiguous in-
tent that the Bureau consider CCCs among possible placements for
sentenced offenders facing imprisonment.
Finally, in its search for explicit, positive authorization for CCC
placement, the Memorandum ignores the absence of any prohibition
against authorizing placement in a CCC.25 4 Setting aside the DOJ's
"rather dog-eared trick of the 'artful negative," 255 at least one court
pointed out that the language of § 3621 (b) could not be any clearer
in directing the breadth of the Bureau's discretion and noted that the
search for further positive authorization is "flat chicanery."2 56 Indeed,
the Memorandum erred by relying upon selective and inconsistent
precedent;257 the number of decisions actually supporting the Memo-
randum's contention and new "policy" is "exactly zero."25 8
249 Id.
250 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
251 lacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1025 (D. Mass. 2003).
252 See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (2000).
253 Memorandum, supra note 17, at 3, 6-7; see Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1029-30.
254 See Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1026.
255 Id.
256 See id.
257 See id. at 1030 (noting that "decisional authority is not nearly as uniform as the
memo's selective quotations would suggest").
258 See id. at 1033.
2005]
CORAELL LAW REVIEW
B. Probing the Breadth of the DOJ's Authority to Change
Bureau Practice
In 28 C.F.R. § 0.1, Congress clearly identifies the Bureau of Pris-
ons as a principal organizational unit under the authority of the
DOJ. 2 5 9 Section 0.95 further details the general functions of the Di-
rector of the Bureau of Prisons, including the "[p] rovision of suitable
quarters for, and safekeeping, care, and subsistence of, all persons
charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States or
help as witnesses or otherwise," 2 60 and the "[c]lassification, commit-
ment, control, or treatment of persons committed to the custody of
the Attorney General."2 6 1 More specifically, section 0.96 confirms that
the Director of the Bureau may perform any of the duties conferred
on the Attorney General, including "[d] esignating places of imprison-
ment or confinement where the sentences of prisoners shall be served
and ordering transfers from one institution or another,"2 62 and
"[e]stablishing and designating Bureau of Prisons Institutions. '" 263
Together, these provisions confirm the DOJ's direct authority
over the Bureau, as well as the breadth of the Bureau's power to desig-
nate inmates to a variety of prison facilities. Joint DOJ and Bureau
manuals and other documentation confirm this relationship and
these shared responsibilities.2 64 These authorities do not, however,
evidence whether this relationship is truly symbiotic or whether the
Memorandum represents an effort by the DOJ to reach down from
above and intervene in the daily operations of the Bureau. Former
Director Kathleen Hawk Sawyer characterized placing prisoners di-
rectly in CCCs as "deeply-rooted" even after the release of the Memo-
randum,265 revealing a difference of opinion within the DOJ. Several
courts have criticized as disingenuous the Memorandum's attempt to
pose as if responding to a Bureau inquiry about its legal authority
when some at the Bureau appeared just as surprised as federal judges
by the reinterpretation. 266 Nonetheless, it remains clear that the DOJ
has authority to alter the policies of the organizational units it over-
sees, including the Bureau.
Irrespective of the breadth of the DOJ's power over Bureau pol-
icy, however, the DOJ lacks the authority to interpret the Sentencing
Guidelines or to "harmoniously interpret" the Guidelines alongside its
259 See 28 C.F.R. § 0.1 (2004).
260 Id. § 0.95(b).
261 Id. § 0.95(d); see 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a) (2) (2000).
262 28 C.F.R. § 0.96(c).
263 Id. § 0.96(p).
264 See supra Part I.B.
265 See Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1022.
266 See text accompanying notes 16-34, 102.
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own enacting statutes.267 The DOJ's efforts to interpret § 3621 in line
with section 5C1.1 of the Guidelines are misplaced and laden with
error, resting upon textual analysis and legislative history concerning
the prerelease, rather than the community corrections, component of
CCCs. 2 6 8 Even if Congress had intended the Guidelines to restrict the
Bureau, the instructions of section 5C1.1 still would not constitute a
"blanket prohibition against using community confinement place-
ments."2 69 The fact remains that the Guidelines' silence on the issue
of the community corrections component should not be interpreted
as a prohibition on judicial recommendations for direct CCC place-
ment or an indication that the Bureau may never place individuals in
CCCs. Such analysis stretches far beyond the scope of the Guidelines
and does not heed their plain language or legislative history.
The Commission does not have the authority to limit the discre-
tion of the Bureau, whose duties are explicitly outlined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 4042.270 The Guidelines "govern [only] what ajudge does in impos-
ing a sentence; they do not control what the [Bureau] does after the
sentence is imposed." 271 The Commission's enabling statute gives it
authority only over the sentencing responsibilities of courts, listing the
Bureau as merely a partner in the sentencing process. 27 2 The Com-
mission's enabling statute and the Guidelines do not discuss specific
places of imprisonment, implicitly acknowledging that this task is the
purview of the Bureau.273 Consequently, it is nonsensical to suggest
that the plain language of section 5C1.1 makes decades of Bureau
placement decisions unlawful.27 4
Finally, even if it were appropriate to apply the Guidelines to the
Bureau, proper statutory analysis concerning Bureau practice should
center on the governing statutes, because "statutes trump guidelines,
267 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (noting that Congress intended the
Guidelines to bind the federal courts and no one else).
268 See Program Statement No. 7310.04, supra note 13, at 4-5 (describing the distinc-
tion between the two CCC components); Memorandum, supra note 17, at 7-8 (describing
inmates' relative freedom at the prerelease stage as one of the reasons the DOJ did not
consider confinement in a CCC to constitute imprisonment).
269 See Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1033. The court also notes that the language of
section 5C1.1, when discussing the prerelease component, does not say that the minimum
term will be followed by community confinement, but rather that the minimum term of a
prescribed sentence may be satisfied by "'a sentence of imprisonment that includes a term
of supervised release with a condition that substitutes community confinement,'" sug-
gesting that community confinement itself is a form of imprisonment. Id. at 1034 (quoting
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.1 (c) (2) (2001)).
270 See 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (2000).
271 Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1033.
272 See Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 542 (M.D. La. 2003).
273 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (2000) (specifying only that the Commission consider "the
nature and capacity of the penal, correctional, and other facilities and services available").
274 See lacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d. at 1033-35.
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not vice versa. '275 The Jacaboni court noted that the Supreme Court
"could not have been more emphatic" in directing that regardless of
the breadth of discretion that Congress granted the Commission to
formulate sentencing guidelines, the Commission must nonetheless
"bow to the specific directives of Congress. '276 As such, even if the
Commission were steadfastly committed to forcing a distinction be-
tween community confinement and imprisonment, such a directive
could not restrict the discretion of the Bureau, whose primary author-
ity lies in § 3621.277 Significantly, § 3621 (b) does not instruct the Bu-
reau to consider the Guidelines themselves, but only "policy
statements" issued by the Commission. 278 Not only is the instruction
to the Bureau permissive, indicating that the Bureau may consider any
of the enumerated factors,2 79 but, more directly, the Commission has
never issued a policy statement concerning community confinement
placements. 28 0
The language of § 3621 clearly grants the Bureau broad discre-
tion to commit offenders to any facility it deems appropriate. 28' To
date, no court, either at the trial or appellate level, has held to the
contrary.28 2 As the lacaboni court so cogently notes, "The [Bureau]
may use its discretion in various ways; it may not, through an errone-
ous interpretation of its powers, attempt to divest itself of the discre-
tion Congress has given it."283 Considering the intended scope of the
Guidelines, the Bureau's enacting statutes, and relevant precedent, it
would be improper to permit the Guidelines to trump unambiguous
statutory language. The Commission and Guidelines do not wield
power over the Bureau, and thus, even in the spirit of "harmonious
interpretation, '" 284 they should not encourage the DOJ to divest the
Bureau of the broad discretion Congress delegated to it.
275 Id. at 1024.
276 Id. (citing United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997)).
277 See Howard, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 543.
278 See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2000).
279 See id.
280 See Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 207 (D. Mass. 2003); Iacaboni, 251 F.
Supp. 2d at 1027.
281 See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b); supra note 67 and accompanying text.
282 Cf Howard, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 544 (noting that the government could not produce
cases addressing the appropriate question: "whether community confinement is a form of
imprisonment under [§ 3621, which] fleshes out the concept of 'place of imprisonment'
by using the term 'any penal or correctional facility"').
283 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
284 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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C. The DOJ Memorandum Lacks the Power to Persuade the
Courts
1. Dissecting the Power to Persuade
An agency's interpretation of the statutes it administers generally
warrants judicial deference, so long as the agency gives "effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. '28 5 As noted in Part
III.A, however, agency interpretations in the form of opinion letters or
interpretative rules merit judicial deference only to the extent that
they are persuasive 28 6 and only when the statutory language is ambigu-
ous. 28 7 The analyses in Parts III.A, III.B, and IV.A argue that the lan-
guage of § 3621 is not ambiguous regarding the breadth of the
Bureau's authority or the definition of imprisonment. For this rea-
son, the flexibility of an interpretive rule or opinion on this issue is
rather limited.
A court may defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute be-
cause of the agency's presumed familiarity or expertise in a particular
area 288 but is in no way bound by an agency's previous representations
or interpretations.28 9 Agency interpretations represent "a body of ex-
perience and informed judgment" upon which a court may rely.290
However, courts need not uphold an agency policy "that merely satis-
fies the test of reasonableness. '" 291 Rather, courts may exercise their
own judgment and defer to the agency's interpretation "only to the
extent that those interpretations have the 'power to persuade."' 292 In
the end, "[e]ach case must stand on its own facts," and the weight of
any agency interpretation hinges upon "the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with ear-
lier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control."293
285 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
286 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRAcrICE § 4.11, at 326 (2d ed. 1997) ("[L]egislative rules are
binding on courts as an extension of legislative power whereas interpretative rules have
only the effect courts choose to give them.").
287 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
288 See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415,
424-25 (1999) (deferring to the agency because of its expertise in the immigration
context).
289 See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); see also Peter L.
Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential
Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 822-23 (2001) (explaining that the Supreme Court in
Skidmore and in Mead recognized that independent analysis of the language and intent of a
statute is the exclusive purview of the courts).
290 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
291 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
292 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
293 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
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Where, as in this instance, an interpretation conflicts with a previ-
ous interpretive rule, some courts have opined that such interpreta-
tions deserve less deference than an interpretation consistently
espoused by an agency.29 4 An agency's initial interpretation of a stat-
ute need not be "carved in stone, ' 295 and agencies "must be given
ample latitude to 'adapt their rules and policies to the demands of
changing circumstances.' "296 Nonetheless, consistency in an agency's
interpretation represents a significant marker for evaluating the legiti-
macy of subsequent changes in policy or practice. 297
2. Unsettled Precedent: May Interpretive Rules Bind Future
Interpretation ?
The Supreme Court in Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospita298
clearly stated that an interpretation that adopts a new position incon-
sistent with existing regulations triggers APA rulemaking require-
ments. 299 The Court's reasoning behind this argument suggests that
such an interpretation effectively amends or repeals the existing regu-
lation.300 If one assumes that the Memorandum is a substantive rule,
as discussed in Part III, the Memorandum clearly triggers APA re-
quirements and is procedurally invalid. Similarly, if one agrees that
the Memorandum presents a position that is inconsistent with the
plain meaning of § 3621, the Memorandum substantively lacks
merit.30 1 Courts have not, however, clearly articulated whether an
agency may amend or repeal an interpretive rule or policy statement
without running afoul of APA requirements, leaving open the ques-
tion of whether an agency's prior interpretation can be so long-stand-
ing that it has legal effect and may be changed only through notice
and comment procedures. Courts thus have not conclusively offered
guidance to parties like the federal courts and the Bureau, who oper-
ated in reliance upon what appeared to be a settled interpretation.
Some courts and commentators have focused on the relatively
flexible nature of interpretive rules, noting that Congress intended
them to be administrative tools to explain, but not to supplement,
substantive regulations.30 2 To this end, they have noted that Congress
294 See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994).
295 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863
(1984).
296 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)
(quoting In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784 (1968)).
297 See Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
158-59 (2000).
298 514 U.S. 87 (1995).
299 See id. at 100.
300 See id.
301 See supra discussion Part [V.A.
302 See Anthony, supra note 2, at 13 & n.43.
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exempted interpretive rules from the more cumbersome APA proce-
dures, implicitly delegating to agencies the authority to interpret stat-
utes where Congress has left a gap or ambiguity.30 3 On this theory,
agencies must have the flexibility to amend or repeal an initial inter-
pretation of a gap or ambiguity, as well as to adapt to changed circum-
stances, so long as both interpretations are fairly encompassed within
the original regulation. 30 4 Some courts have upheld this view, sug-
gesting that so long as the agency has not definitively spoken on an
informal policy, a new interpretive rule may overrule a long-standing
informal policy. 30 5 This position clearly recognizes the importance of
preserving interpretive rules as flexible administrative tools and sug-
gests that even long-standing interpretations do not bear the force or
effect of law in court.
In contrast, other courts and commentators have recognized that
interpretive rules, guidance manuals, and policy statements have enor-
mous consequences in agency regulation and, in practice, are often
regarded as binding.30 6 The watershed administrative-law case Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council30 7
first hinted that "a totally unjustified departure from well-settled
agency procedures of long standing might require judicial correc-
tion. '' 30 8 Complementing the Supreme Court's clear statement in
Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital,30 9 the D.C. Court of Appeals has
held, on several occasions, that an interpretation that differs signifi-
cantly from a previous interpretation effectively amends the rule it-
303 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984); discussion supra Part III. But see Peter L. STRAUSS, TODD D. RAKOFF & C rNHIA R.
FARINA, GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 716 (rev. 10th
ed. 2003) (discussing concerns that agencies will purposely enact vague substantive rules,
and subsequently seek to fill in the gaps through interpretation, in order to avoid the
required notice and disclosure that the APA would generally demand).
304 See Robert A. Anthony & David A. Codevilla, Pro-Ossification: A Harder Look at Agency
Policy Statements, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 667, 678-79 (1996).
305 See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 291 F.3d 49, 57-58 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (finding that an interpretation did not trigger APA protections where it was not
inconsistent with the existing substantive regulation); Chief Prob. Officers v. Shalala, 118
F.3d 1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the notice and comment requirement is
triggered when an interpretation conflicts with a prior rule, not merely a prior
interpretation).
306 See, e.g., Anthony & Codevilla, supra note 304, at 679 (commenting that those who
make adjudicatory decisions often apply policy statements in "the same routinely control-
ling way as they apply legislative rules").
307 435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978) (holding, ironically, that the APA represents the maxi-
mum procedural requirements that may be imposed upon agencies and that Congress and
agencies, rather than courts, should impose any extra procedural safeguards when
necessary).
308 Id. at 542.
309 514 U.S. 87, 100 (1995).
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self.3 10 Concerning the Memorandum in this instance, at least one
court similarly suggested that the DOJ's previous guidance manuals
and interpretations have some precedential value and questioned
whether long-standing interpretive rules should be wholly exempt
from APA procedures.3 11 Stating that "when an interpretation departs
from a long-standing agency practice, it too must be promulgated
under the general APA notice and comment procedures," the Howard
court acknowledged the unique nature of long-standing interpreta-
tions. 312 Similarly, the Iacaboni court asserted that the rule in question
"represent[ed] a drastic departure from the [Bureau's] previous regu-
lations and policies" 313 and concluded that the Bureau "must comply
with the strictures of the APA."'314 Even if long-standing interpreta-
tions do not trigger additional protections, since the APA itself does
not distinguish between initial and subsequent interpretations, an
agency must nonetheless publicly explain the reasoning behind its
new interpretation in order for a reviewing court to later deem it
reasonable.315
In this instance, there is no doubt that federal courts and the
Bureau relied upon the long-standing practice and written statements
issued by the DOJ.3 16 As noted above, even after the DOJ had issued
the Memorandum, Kathleen Hawk Sawyer commented that the policy
of directly placing offenders in the community corrections compo-
nent of CCCs was deeply rooted.317 The ire and surprise of federal
310 See, e.g., Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (suggesting that "[o]nce an agency gives its regulation an interpretation, it can only
change that interpretation as it would formally modify the regulation itself: through the
process of notice and comment rulemaking"); Alaska Prof'l Hunters Ass'n v. Fed. Aviation
Admin., 177 F.3d 1030, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
311 See, e.g., Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 536 (M.D. La. 2003) ("[W]hen an
interpretation departs from a long-standing agency practice, it too must be promulgated
under the general APA notice and comment procedures. There is no doubt that the new
Bureau 'policy' is the exact opposite from its past policy and practice with regard to direct
CCC commitments. Thus ... it is highly probable that the court could conclude that the
Bureau has issued a 'rule' that requires notice and comment.") (citation omitted).
312 Id. at 525, 536 (citing Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622, 630 (5th Cir.
2001)).
313 See lacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1040 (D. Mass. 2003).
314 Id.
315 See Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense ofSeminole Rock Deference to
Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 49, 79 (2000); supra Part III.A (noting
that courts regard interpretive rules with Skidmore deference, a relatively weak deference,
and evaluate these rules for their reasonableness).
816 The court in Alaska Professional Hunters suggested that written statements evidenc-
ing official advice concerning a policy are an important factor in considering the reasona-
bleness of an interpretation as well as whether the interpretation is fairly encompassed
within the regulation. See Alaska Profl Hunters Ass'n v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 177 F.3d
1030, 1031-32 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding it significant that the Alaska Region never set
forth its interpretation in a written statement).
317 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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judges nationwide confirms this characterization. Although no single
document appears to specifically embrace the propriety of placing in-
dividuals directly in the community corrections component of CCCs, a
series of DOJ manuals and documents historically encouraged the
practice.318 Perhaps most notably, the DOJ asserted that the "Bureau
may designate an offender directly to a community based facility to
serve his or her sentence," noting that "ordinarily this is done only
with the concurrence of the sentencing court. '319 This guidance only
reaffirmed the Bureau and Commission's representations to Congress
in 1994, which posited that the "community corrections component
[was] designed to be sufficiently punitive to be a legitimate sanc-
tion. '320 Together, these and other documents consistently con-
firmed the availability and propriety of direct placement in the
community corrections component of CCCs, supporting the Bureau's
broad discretion to place offenders in CCCs and the courts' right to
recommend such placement.
The precedential value of the DOJ's publications and representa-
tions remains unclear, as does the answer to whether an interpretive
rule that replaces a long-standing interpretation triggers APA
rulemaking requirements.321 It is clear, however, that the pre-2002
DOJ documents directly contradict the Memorandum and inform
courts' inquiries as to the reasonableness of the DOJ's interpretation.
As such, these publications and representations retain their relevance,
not only in assessing the substantive merits of the agency's actions, but
also as part of a court's inquiry into the nature, consistency, and rea-
sonableness of the DOJ's actions.
3. The Memorandum's Faulty Statutory Analysis and Misapplication
of the Facts Fail to Harness the Power to Persuade
It is unlikely that a reviewing court would consider the Memoran-
dum to be either reasonable or independently persuasive. As Parts III
and IV discuss, a court will likely find that the Memorandum miscon-
strued the plain terms of § 3621, straying outside of the language of
the statute and its legislative history to reinterpret punishment and
the proper role of CCCs. As such, a court will likely conclude that the
Memorandum is not reasonable where it does not comport with the
proper dictionary definitions of the terms "penal" and "correc-
tional."322 Similarly, a court will likely criticize the Memorandum's
318 See, e.g., JUDICIAL RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 93; Program Statement No. 7310.04,
supra note 13.
319 SeeJuDIcLAL RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 93, at 16.
320 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 70, at 9-10; see supra notes 83-85 and accompany-
ing text.
321 See supra notes 298-315.
322 See supra text accompanying notes 224-28.
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consistent failure to treat the community corrections and prerelease
components of CCCs separately, finding this characterization to be at
odds with representations in Bureau manuals that the DOJ itself pub-
lished.323 Noting that the Memorandum did not originate out of a
particular agency expertise, a court will likely consider the statutory
and legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3621 and its predecessor to con-
firm the lack of ambiguity as to the breadth of authority Congress
intended to delegate to the Bureau.3 24 Moreover, acknowledging that
Congress and the Commission intended for the Guidelines to bind
only courts' discretion, a court will likely scrutinize the Memoran-
dum's emphasis upon "harmonious interpretation,"'3 25 and be uncon-
vinced by this apparent effort to "divest [the Bureau] of the discretion
that Congress has given it. ' '326
Taken together, these analyses do not undercut the DOJ's power
or authority to change or even reinterpret the breadth of the Bureau's
discretion and its treatment of CCC facilities. These analyses do, how-
ever, demonstrate that the DOJ selected the wrong administrative tool
to implement its vision. Many factors make the DOJ's efforts to char-
acterize its policy as an interpretive rule suspect. The DOJ's answer as
to whether the Bureau may place certain offenders in CCCs is not self-
evident, nor does it articulate a duty fairly encompassed within the
regulation. 327 To the contrary, numerous DOJ publications and rep-
resentations previously articulated a policy directly contrary to that of
the Memorandum while purporting to interpret the same statute. 328
The DOJ is not precluded from reinterpreting its policy toward
placing prisoners directly in CCCs. In light of the aforementioned
factors, however, the DOJ must acknowledge that such a reinterpreta-
tion effectively amends the current rule or, at the very least, amends a
long-standing interpretation. 329 As such, the DOJ should implement
such a policy only by complying with notice and comment procedures
under the APA, a process through which the DOJ must answer its crit-
ics in a reasonable manner, subject to the court's review of its proce-
dural efforts and its substantive answers. As it stands, it would not be
difficult for a court to deem the Memorandum unreasonable for any
of the many reasons discussed above.
323 See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
324 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
325 See Memorandum, supra note 17, at 6.
326 See lacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1038 (D. Mass. 2003).
327 See supra note 161; discussion supra Part III.B.1.
328 See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
329 See discussion supra Part IV.C.2.
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CONCLUSION
The motivation behind the DOJ's Memorandum and revised
CCC policy remains unclear. The Memorandum deprived judges of
an important sentencing tool for difficult borderline cases, especially
those involving personal or economic hardship.330 Prisoners who suc-
cessfully petitioned the court received preliminary injunctions and
were permitted to remain in CCC facilities for the duration of their
sentences. 331 Those who were unsuccessful, and those who will face
sentencing in the future, no longer have the option of imprisonment
in the community corrections component of CCCs. 332 Although the
number of cases on this issue has diminished because of a decrease in
petitioners who have standing to challenge the rule, the impact of the
Memorandum persists, preventing judges from sentencing any low-
level offenders directly to CCCs. 3 33 Fundamentally, the Memorandum
also deprived the federal government and taxpayers of an important
cost-saving tool; prisoner placement in CCCs freed taxpayers from the
cost of a minimum-security prison facility for select offenders and also
from funding welfare and other social benefits for prisoners' families,
because offenders continued to provide financially for their
families.334
Despite the DOJ's efforts to characterize it otherwise, the Memo-
randum constitutes a substantive rule, one which admits of no excep-
tion, offers no meaningful opportunity for input, and severely restricts
the Bureau's power and discretion.335 The Memorandum muddies
the interpretation of the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3621, disre-
garding the distinction between the community corrections and prer-
elease components of CCCs, and misinterprets the proper scope of
the Guidelines' authority. It is clear that the Guidelines do not re-
strict the Bureau's authority to place offenders in the community cor-
rections component of CCCs and do not even mention this
component by name. Moreover, the Guidelines in no way purport to
undercut the broad authority granted to the Bureau in § 3621. On
these grounds, the DOJ Memorandum fails as either a substantive or
330 See supra text accompanying notes 9-15, 75-81.
331 See Iacaboni, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1045; Byrd v. Moore, 252 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306
(W.D.N.C. 2003); Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 547 (M.D. La. 2003).
332 The Bureau retains the power, however, to place inmates in such facilities for no
more than ten percent of their sentence in the prerelease component. See supra note 91
and accompanying text.
333 See, e.g., Judge Hellerstein, Crowley v. the Federal Bureau of Prisons: Bureau of Pris-
ons is Wrong to Adopt Restrictive Policy on Placing Inmates in Halfway Houses, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 24,
2004, at 23; Tom Schoenberg, Halfway House Backlash: Low-Level Offenders Battle New DOJ
Policy Calling for More Hard Time, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 10, 2003, at 1.
334 See supra note 13.
335 See Monahan v. Winn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 196, 215 (D. Mass. 2003) (commenting that
the DOJ was trying to "have its cake and eat it too").
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interpretive rule. Notwithstanding these arguments, the Bureau and
the DOJ do retain the power to reevaluate their policies regarding
CCCs and to disregard judicial recommendations. The guidelines of
the APA, however, do not permit the DOJ to simply reverse a long-
standing policy and implement an administrative rule bearing the
force of law without ensuring adequate due process through notice
and comment procedures.
